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1. Introduction 
adda and Tridico’s edited volume is a book with two layers: it is, first, an 
applied book about the European economic and financial crisis. But it is also 
a book about the competition of ideasin economic research more generally. 
In times where theEuropean crisis is first and foremost interpreted as a crisis of 
exhausted public budgets and an imperfect monetary union, the purpose of this 
book is no less than to present a totally different set of ideas and understandings of 
the world, leading to contrary interpretations of the crisis and policy implications. 
To do so, Fadda and Tridicomarshal diverse heterodox approaches interpreting the 
origins of the current European crisis (part I of the book) and discussing exit 
perspectives and political strategies (part II). Having put these pieces together in a 
volume, this book is both a forceful critique of (mainstream) economics as a 
discipline and of European crisis policies over the last years. 
 
2. Competing ideas about the origins of the European crisis 
Against this background, I find it highly appropriate and helpful to start with 
John Groenewegen’s chapter about the role of ideas, models and representations of 
the world in economics and how these shape interpretations of crisis phenomena. 
Groenewegen chooses to contrast neoclassical and new institutional economics on 
the one hand and original institutional economics on the other, discussing their 
representations and understandings of the economy and of economic crises. While 
it is not quite clear to me what motivated this choice (except of course that 
Groenewegen is a renowned expert of original institutional economics), it is a 
helpful exercise for what follows, as it motivates the reader to reflect upon the 
ontological and epistemological basis of economic research and policy 
recommendations. 
The following five chapters challenge dominant interpretations of the origins of 
the European financial and economic crisis, presenting different ideas and 
interpretations from a diverse range of angles. Philip Arestis and Elias Karakitsos 
discuss financial liberalisation and increasing inequality. Malcolm Sawyer 
addresses financialization and the lack of sustainable investment, somewhat similar 
to Wolfram Elsner, who emphasizes the chasing of impossibly high profit rates in 
financial capitalism. Brigitte Young discusses the role of ideas in a literal sense, 
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investigating how the prevalence of ordoliberalism in German economic (public) 
thinking has shaped German and European politics vis-à-vis the crisis. Finally, 
Pasquale Tridico uses the example of Italy to show how deregulation and 
flexibilization of the labour market and privatization in the run-up to the crisis have 
made the Italian economy highly crisis-prone and susceptible to risk while at the 
same time making the European crisis management with its emphasis on austerity 
policies particularly fatal. 
All these chapters emphasize, from different angles, that “the current crisis is 
the final step of a much longer decline which started [in the 1990s]” (Tridico’s 
chapter, p. 114). While the authors differ in the particular factors they put emphasis 
on, they agree on one point: The origin of the European crisis is not (primarily) a 
sovereign debt issue. Rather, the European reality of our times – as in all times – is 
“multi-dimensional, complex, full of interdependencies, feedback loops, different 
groups of actors with different motivations, interests, power and values” 
(Groenewegen’s chapter, p. 9). Thus it is no contradictory but a strongly 
complementary analysis that the authors provide in the different chapters of the 
book’s first part.  
Arestis and Karakitsos posit that the economic crisis was caused by three main 
factors: inequality, financial liberalization and financial innovation. They provide 
ample statistical evidence of the rise of inequality, without however explaining 
how exactly this contributed to the crisis, and it is striking that distribution is not 
addressed explicitly in their policy implications anymore. On the other hand, their 
discussion of the financial sector and proposals for its regulation in the US and the 
UK is insightful. Following just after Groenewegen’s chapter, the authors may 
have been more explicit about their theoretical foundations.  
Malcolm Sawyer emphasizes the role of the financial system, too, albeit 
discussing some more fundamental concerns. As he explains, financial sector 
growth is commonly assumed topush economic growth, which is commonly seen 
as desirable. But this is not uncontroversial: In fact, it seems that financial sector 
growth is beneficial for economic growth only up to a certain threshold, after 
which it actually harms growth. Sawyer entertainingly points out that in this sense, 
financialization may be good for the environment: Recessions stemming from 
financial crises lower future levels of output and may tend to diminish carbon 
emissions. Joking aside, he argues that investment must be directed towards 
sustainable activities and that economic growth must not only be slower but also of 
the ‘right type’. Such developments may be stimulated by financial transaction 
taxes, green development banks and guided lending. 
Wolfram Elsner adds a Marxian account of why the unlimited mobility of 
speculative capital is highly detrimental to our economies and societies. Since the 
1970s, he argues, possible profits rates to be achieved with capital investments 
have decreased considerably, pushing capital to move into speculation and to create 
ever-bigger bubbles. The rising gap between real and financial (speculative) 
investment and of their respective profit rates can remain undetected for a while, 
but unfolds its detrimental potential once a bubble explodes. As a perverse effect, 
the political reaction to the resulting crises consists of redistributive measures, 
typically bailouts and austerity politics, which are represented as without 
alternatives. 
To sum up, the contributions concur that the political and societal focus on high 
economic growth rates, coming along with the acceptance of high sought-for 
profit-rates of firms and beliefs in the benefit of ever-higher degrees of 
(speculative) financialization is not only problematic in terms of environmental and 
societal stability, but has ultimately compromised economic stability. As these 
developments occurred at the same time as labour markets were increasingly 
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deregulated and social systems retrenched, the economies and their purchasing 
power were hit very hard at a moment in time where their own recovery power was 
quite low.  
Of course, such understandings and interpretations of the crisis are not 
commonplace among European economists and populations, and much less so in 
the Northern European countries. This is so, as Brigitte Young’s chapter discusses, 
because they run counter the idea and belief system of ordoliberalism, which 
prevails in German academic and public discourse and has been able to dominate 
over Post-Keynesian and other understandings. I remember that during the EAEPE 
Summer School 2013, from which this book originates and of which I was a 
participant, Young’s argument was quite unknown to most of us. Since then, 
however, whenever I am confronted with arguments of politicians or newspaper 
articles on the topic, I realize how crucial these underlying ideas are for 
understanding the dynamics in the European crisis interpretation. 
 
3. Competing ideas about where to go from here 
Given this interpretation of the crisis origins, it is no surprise that for the 
authors, austerity politics cannot be the remedy: They do not tackle financialization 
nor the search for high profit rates nor bring about more sustainable economies. To 
the contrary, they make things worse: They increase socio-economic inequality and 
depress aggregate demand, thus perpetuating – according to the authors – the very 
origins of the crisis. Yet austerity is the prevailing answer to the crisis among 
European politicians and economists – because, again, the prevalent interpretation 
of the crisis through the lenses of ordoliberalism is a totally different one. The 
second part of the book discusses the effects of austerity and possible other routes 
the European union should take in order to overcome the current crisis. Proposals 
and topics include the role of the welfare state, the European currency union, 
household credits and common labour market policies. 
Sebastiano Fadda’s chapter on austerity politics and retrenchments of the 
welfare state introduces the second part. He first addresses three commonplace 
critiques of welfare states that citizens of all European countries should have heard 
too often over the last years: budget unsustainability, negative implications of large 
welfare states for global competitiveness, and inefficiencies in terms of resource 
allocation and cost-effectiveness. He discards these criticisms as not being to the 
point: first, unsustainability critiques are based upon arbitrary definitions of limits 
of social spending as expenditure to GNP. Second, global competitiveness is not 
necessarily compromised by strong welfare states, but may as well benefit from 
them. Countries only gain in competitiveness if they engage in social dumping 
compared to others, but not if all countries cut their social spending. Third, it may 
actually be more efficient and competitive to guarantee social cohesion, social and 
human capital and political stability through welfare states. While acknowledging 
that reforms are in order in many places and that European welfare states could 
certainly reduce their costs and work more efficiently, he convincingly warns 
against throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  
What other options and remedies are at our disposition then? Vincent 
Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier, Pascal Petit and Jamel Saadaoui discuss policy options 
for overcoming the financial crisis of the European currency union. Given that 
exchange rate adjustments among members of the currency union are impossible 
and common fiscal policies have been politically sensitive, the authors argue, the 
Eurozone has taken a dangerous road: relative wage and price flexibility have 
partly been able to do the job of exchange rate adjustments, however at the price of 
lower growth, higher unemployment and heterogeneous effects across countries. 
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Also this policy has not alleviated the problem of huge intra-European imbalances: 
the currency is too weak for Northern Europe and too strong for Southern Europe. 
This situation amounts to implicit transfers from the South to the North, making the 
overall situation worse.  
Having read the introduction to this chapter, I was left with the desire that this 
issue had been devoted more attention in the first part of the book already. Given 
that the European public understands this crisis, besides the public deficit issue, as 
a currency union issue, why did the editors not decide to present their perspective 
on this important issue in the first part of the book? Given that important parts of 
the general public in Northern European countries tend to interpret the weak 
performances of Southern European countries as signs of economic incompetence 
and laziness, a discussion about the currency union and the crucial role of 
macroeconomic heterogeneities between countries would have deserved a much 
more prominent place in the first part of the book, too. 
Duwicquet et al. are very clear about their policy recommendation, which is as 
much logical as it is politically explosive: Based upon the premise that 
macroeconomic heterogeneity problems can only be solved through a much 
stronger integration, they advocate that transfers and debt restructuration within the 
European Union are paramount. More concretely, they see two scenarios that, in 
their view, would permit the European union to survive. One is fiscal federalism: 
They propose a federal budget, financed through taxes on savings, capital incomes 
and financial transaction. This proposal thus builds a bridge to several of the 
othercrisis origins discussed earlier. The authors are well aware that the major 
obstacle to this solution is not of technical, but of political nature, and are actually 
quite pessimistic: “The European people does not exist and there is a very limited 
solidarity between the different members of the union” (Duwicquetet al., p. 147).  
Their second proposal is probably less sensitive in political terms since it 
accommodates somehow the voices in Northern Europe opting for a separation of 
the Eurozone. A so-called ‘multi-speed Eurozone’ would reintroduce national 
currencies along with an ‘external Euro’, allowing for more flexible adjustments 
when imbalances within the Eurozone are detected. The latter proposal would offer 
an answer to macroeconomic imbalances without however tackling the sensitive 
issue of heterogeneous social models and their convergence or not.  
The challenge of finding a balance between homogenous regulations and 
heterogeneous countries is as well the topic of Jacek Wallusch and BeataWoźniak-
Jęchorek’s chapter on common labour market policies. Rather than addressing the 
crisis directly, they discuss future directions of labour market policies in Europe. 
They put emphasis on the difficulty of identifying a “one fits all” labour market 
approach, since levels of both regulations and policies and real wages differ 
strongly across countries. Because different labour markets need different types of 
regulations, the authors warn that “[i]mposing regulations at the EU level might be 
extremely difficult” (p. 195).  
Two more contributions complete the second part of the book. The chapter by 
Maria Lissowska, which clearly discusses crisis origins rather than exit strategies, 
covers an interesting topic: the issue of household over-indebtedness. Lissowskadis 
cusses if consumption and private credit played a decisive role in the run-up to the 
crisis and/or if the promotion of household debts may actually be a means of 
recovery, stimulating purchasing power and demand in European countries. Not 
surprisingly, she argues that household credits cannot be a sustainable way of 
overcoming household difficulties to meet consumption needs. 
Finally, there is a chapter by Ngai-Ling Sum, dealing with economic 
imaginaries and their role in time of crisis. She uses the case of the BRIC countries 
to show how narratives of highly dynamic high-growth countries were constructed 
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in global public discourse. Although this is an interesting reading, the author does 
not make any straight connection to the European crisis. Still, the idea that “[i]n 
times of crisis, economic and political actors often search for and/or construct 
objects of ‘growth’, ‘hope’ and ‘strength’ that may secure recovery” (p. 200), and 
which the author discusses with respect to the BRICs, is easily transferable to the 
European crisis: Economic growth has indeed been emphasized by both politicians 
and academics as a way out of the crisis. Most authors in this volume have 
pronounced themselves in favour of high economic growth in order to stabilize 
labour markets, public budgets and so forth. But Malcolm Sawyer’s exposition of 
the link between economic growth, financialisation and sustainable development 
may have deserved stronger attention. Is it really necessary to foster strong 
economic growth for recovery? And, more importantly, is it possible? 
Unemployment, the rise of right-wing parties in several European countries and the 
threat of disintegration of the monetary union, if not the European Union itself, are 
all pressing problems. But we should not forget the important over the urgent 
matters: to create a sustainable future for the European and the global society, in 
accordance with our social and natural environments. 
 
4. Quo vadis, Europe? 
Closing the cover of this book, I feel I have been provided with a rich, multi-
dimensional analysis of the factors that have contributed to the occurrence of the 
European economic and financial crisis, and with a discussion of policiesthat are 
no solutions. According to the authors, Europe should not cut the welfare states but 
take care of limiting social and economic inequalities in order to create stable and 
sustainable societies. For achieving this goal, countries should find ways to limit 
financial speculation but foster socially and environmentally sustainable 
investment instead. Countries should create incentives accordingly instead of 
allowing firms to endanger stability by chasing impossibly high profit rates. 
Any discussion of crisis origins implies that such dynamics should be avoided 
in the future. Still, some crisis origins might call for clearer statements about what 
to do in the future. For instance, it is implicit in the book that financial markets 
deserve regulation and that the financial sector should serve the economy’s and 
society’s interests rather than developing an adventurous life of its own. How to 
achieve this will be a crucial issue of future academic and public debates, and this 
book has certainly made a major contribution into this direction. 
Closing this book with its rich and multi-fold analyses, it is difficult to 
comprehend how European governments could have opted for a crisis strategy that 
is made up of a generalization of austerity programmes on the one hand and a 
renovation of the Eurozone according to which countries in financial distress are 
provided with funds on the other. After all, one can summarize the crisis 
management by stating that the Northern European governments were able to push 
through policies to their advantage and to the clear disadvantage of Southern 
European (and Northern European non-elite) populations (Duwicquetet al., p. 144). 
On the other hand, this is a little easier to understand from the perspective that 
different parts in the European Union “think differently”. 
With this differentiated contribution, the book goes far beyond the economic 
realm: it goes to the very grain of the European integration project. Are Northern 
European governments and their populations willing to be part and to contribute to 
the formation of a European Union in which there is no competitive gap in 
comparison with the Southern European countries? Are they willing to withstand 
high public deficits in Southern Europe for the time these countries need to 
increase their non-price competitiveness through investments in education, 
TER, 2(2), S. Flechtner, p.127-132. 
131 
Turkish Economic Review 
infrastructure and technology, maybe transferring some of these debts to the 
supranational level? Will Southern European countries be able to convince the 
North of their trustworthiness in this regard? In times where Grexit and Brexit can 
by no means be excluded to happen in the near or medium future, this book proves 
highly timely and helpful to gain a broad and overarching perspective of what is 
actually going on in the Eurozone and European Union – and, not to be forgotten, 
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